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As high-profile domestic violence cases have splashed across the front pages of Massachusetts newspapers in recent years, advocates for victims and survivors say the attention paid to these cases is contributing to a shift in societys view and handling of the problem, but a mountain of work remains to be done.The murder of Jennifer Martel by Jared Remy last August and the killing of Wayland teenager Lauren Astley by her ex-boyfriend, Nathan Fujita, three years ago this month have demonstrated shortcomings in the legal system that handles domestic violence cases and the need to put more safeguards in place to prevent dating and domestic violence, advocates say.
[483-488] Evidence at the trial of a claim for sex discrimination in employment in violation of G.  A claim of sex discrimination in employment was not barred by the six-month statute of limitations set forth in G. [490-496] The awards of damages in a claim of sex discrimination in employment, Page 481 consisting of lost front pay and lost back pay, were neither speculative nor excessive [496-497], and the punitive damages award was not, on the record, excessive [497-498].
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 16, 1993.
The plaintiff had commenced suit in April, 1993, on a complaint alleging that her discharge from CSA in September, 1992, was motivated by unlawful sex discrimination in violation of G.
That they essayed no such additional challenges more likely shows that they in fact had none. Moreover, "the denial of the correct number of peremptory challenges [does not] constitute by itself ground for reversal .
Discussion of the legal framework supporting the "reasonable person standard" jury instruction to be given by the judge in sexual harassment cases. CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 28, 1997. Kramer, for Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Page 410 After an eight-day trial, the jury found in favor of Cahillane, and the judgment was appealed. After the plaintiffs closing argument and in light of a comment the plaintiffs counsel had made, there was another conference between counsel and the judge, this time specifically regarding the "reasonable person standard." Again, no objection was voiced by the plaintiff's counsel with respect to the agreed-on language. 1999) ("we reject the view of those courts that look to the perspective of the particular ethnic or gender group, e.g., a 'reasonable African American' or a 'reasonable Jew"); De Angelis v. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir.), cert. See also Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. [Note 4] It is because the risks of such a particularized instruction harms plaintiffs, not defendants, that a plaintiffs objection should be given significant weight.
Carhart, J., and a claim for sexual harassment was tried before C. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. (Cahillane), alleging that she was wrongfully terminated and subjected to a sexually hostile work environment in violation of G. Specifically, Muzzy, a lesbian, complains that the judge erred in instructing the jury to evaluate her sexual harassment claim from the view of an "objectively reasonable woman of lesbian orientation," and that this error caused such prejudice and confusion among the jurors that a new trial is required. In August, 1995, Muzzy went to work in Cahillane's sales, finance, and insurance department. Now, when you're considering whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, you are to consider not the plaintiff's subjective view but what's called the objective view, the view of an objectively reasonable person, an objectively reasonable woman of lesbian orientation." Following the charge, at a sidebar conference, one of the plaintiff's counsel told the judge that she had "an objection to the lesbian standard that we're using." Counsel stated that she did not feel it was an appropriate standard, that it should have been "a reasonable person standard [Note 5]." She articulated the basis of her objection as follows: "I've looked at a couple of jurors when you read those instructions, and there was a bit of confusion as to . In response to the plaintiffs objection, the judge stated that there had been agreement to the instruction the previous day, that he thought it was an appropriate instruction, and that he was not prepared to change it at that point. No questions were asked by the jury with regard to the judge's instruction on this issue. Rule 51 (b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. The only objection adequately preserved was the one articulated at the time of the objection, and that was the possibility of juror confusion based on counsel's observation of the jurors' faces during the charge.